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ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically analyzes the effect of board characteristics on real earnings management, which is measured 
by using three proxies including abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production costs. Specifically, we will investigate how board independence (or board size) affects real 
earnings management. Additionally, we will investigate the relation between the board characteristics and real 
earnings management according to before K-IFRS mandatory adoption or after K-IFRS mandatory adoption. 
 
The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the relation between board independence (board size) and the 
absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations is statistically significant and positive (+). Second, the relation 
between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of abnormal production costs is statistically 
significant and positive (+). Third, the relation between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary expenses is statistically significant and positive (+). These findings present that the board 
independence (or board size) does not constrain real earnings management. Thus, these mean that board 
independence (or board size) does not work as a mechanism to reduce real earnings management. 
 
This study contributes to accounting research as it directly tests the relation between the board characteristics and 
real earnings management in Korea, providing empirical support that a board independence (board size) does not 
constrain real earnings management as effectively as it constrains accrual earnings management.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
sing hand-collected data on the firm’s board of directors from 2009 to 2014, we examine the relation 
between the board characteristics and real earnings management. The final sample size is 2,565 firm-
year observations for this study. Specifically, we will investigate how board independence (or board 
size) affects real earnings management. Additionally, we will investigate the relation between the board characteristics 
and real earnings management according to before K-IFRS mandatory adoption or after K-IFRS mandatory adoption.  
 
Managers have an incentive to adjust earnings for their own benefit while infringing upon the interests of shareholders. 
Prior studies show that managers have many incentives to manipulate opportunistically earnings (Sun & Liu, 2011). 
Meanwhile, corporate governance plays a role as a device for solving information asymmetry and efficient allocation 
of economic resources to resolve the agency problem among various stakeholders (Shin & Lee, 2014; Kang & Ko, 
2014; Oh, Shin & Hong, 2015; Oh & Shin, 2016). 
 
Independent directors who are outside the company must collect and process a significant amount of company-specific 
information in order to efficiently perform consulting and monitoring tasks (Armstrong, Core & Guay, 2014). Also, 
because outside directors are a means of effectively controlling managers, they can effectively monitor managers in 
the process of financial reporting rather than internal directors (Sun & Liu, 2011).  
 
U 
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Also, the number of director’s influences board decisions and corporate performance (Jensen, 1993). According to 
prior research, board size is negatively correlated with firm value (Yermack, 1996). However, Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2008) insist to require a large board of directors that companies operating in various fields have difficulties 
in consultation and supervision. 
 
Meanwhile, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) show that managers have switched from accrual-based to operating-based 
earnings management after the enactment of SOX. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) investigate firms’ propensity to 
compromise operating-based versus accrual-based earnings management around seasoned equity. Managers 
compromise accrual vs. real earnings management depending on the relative costs (Zang, 2012).  
 
Based on prior literature, we analyze the association between the board characteristics and real earnings management. 
We use Roychowdhury (2006)’ method as real earnings management measure and also use the percentage of its 
outside directors (ratio of independent directors to board size), board size (number of directors on the board) as the 
board characteristics measure.  
 
The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the relation between board independence (board size) and the 
absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations is statistically significant and positive (+). Second, the relation 
between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of abnormal production costs is statistically 
significant and positive (+). Third, the relation between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary expenses is statistically significant and positive (+). These findings present that the board 
independence (or board size) does not constrain real earnings management. Thus, these mean that board independence 
(or board size) does not work as a mechanism to reduce real earnings management.  
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II shows prior literature and develops the research hypothesis. Section III 
presents the research design. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V sets forth the conclusion. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Characteristics of the Board of Directors 
 
Because outside directors are a means of effectively controlling managers, they can effectively monitor managers in 
the process of financial reporting rather than internal directors (Sun & Liu, 2011). Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009) also 
document that board independence may lessen earnings management.  
 
Prior research shows conflicting evidence about the effect of board size on firm valuation. For example, Yermack 
(1996) shows a negative relation between board size and Tobin’s q. However, Cheng (2008) finds larger board can 
reduce firm risk. 
 
2.2 Real Earnings Management 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) documents that managers manipulate operating-based earnings through sales manipulation, 
discretionary expenditures, and production cost.  
 
Cohen et al. (2008) show that, compared with before and after introduction, US firms have lowered discretionary 
accruals after SOX introduction. 
 
Kim, Goh and Koh (2008) have examined whether firms conduct real earnings management to adjust their profits. As 
a result of the verification, it was confirmed that domestic firms do not only adjust profit through accruals but also use 
real earnings management in order to adjust profits. 
 
Based on the prior literature, we hypothesize as follows: 
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H1: There is a association between the board characteristics and the abnormal cash flows from operations.  
 
H1-1: There is aassociation between board independence and the abnormal cash flows from operations. 
 
H2: There is a association between the board characteristics and the abnormal production costs.  
 
H2-1: There is a association between board independence and the abnormal production costs. 
 
H2-2: There is a association between board size and the abnormal production costs. 
 
H3: There is a association between the board characteristics and the abnormal discretionary expenses.  
 
H3-1: There is a association between board independence and the abnormal discretionary expenses.  
 
H3-2: There is a association between board size and the abnormal discretionary expenses. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Regression Models 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 - Hypothesis 3, we use a multivariate regression model to investigate whether board independence (or 
board size) constrains real earnings management as we have expected. Regression models are as follows; 
 𝑅𝐸𝑀$% = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% +𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% + 𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
REM :  real earnings management, measured as Roychowdhury (2006); 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (2); 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (3); 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (4); 
 
Independent Variables 
 
OUTBOARD : board independence, (independent directors / the board size); 
BOARDSIZE : board size, (the number of board of directors / the nature logarithm of total assets); 
 
Control Variables 
 
SIZE : firm size, the nature logarithm of total assets; 
MTB : market-to-book ratio, (market value / book value of common equity); 
LEV : debt ratio, (long-term debt / total assets); 
ROA : return on assets, (income /total assets); 
LOSSDUM : loss dummy variable; 
OWN : ownership; 
FOR : foreign ownership; 
YD : year dummy; 
ID : industry dummy; 𝜀$% : residual. 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2017 Volume 33, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1254 The Clute Institute 
Based on prior literature, we predict a positive (+)/ negative (-) association between OUTBOARD ( or BOARDSIZE ) and 
REM. Control variables are SIZE, MTB, LEV, ROA, LOSSDUM, OWN, FOR (Roychowdhury, 2006; Klein, 2002). SIZE is 
added to control firm size effect and omitted variables effect (Francis, La Fond, Olsson & Schipper, 2005). OWN is ownership. 
FOR is foreign ownership. We included OWN and FOR to control corporate goverance.  
 
3.2 Measures of Real Earnings Management (Roychowdhury 2006)  
 
In this study, real earnings management was measured by Roychowdhury (2006). Expressed the following equation (2) - (4), 
Abnormal operating cash flow (AbOCF), abnormal production costs (AbPRD), and abnormal discretionary expenses (AbSGA) 
are the values obtained by subtracting normal operating cash flow, normal production costs, and normal discretionary expenses 
measured by Roychowdhury (2006) in actual operating cash flow, actual production costs, and actual discretionary expenses, 
respectively. 
 
This means the residuals measured by the Roychowdhury (2006). In this study, the absolute value of the residual is used to 
analyze the magnitude of real earnings management. Thus, the larger the absolute value of the residual, the greater the real 
earnings management. 
 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹$% = IJKLMNOLMPQ 	− 	 a( 	+ 	 a* *	TOLMPQ 	+ 	 a7 UOVWULMNOLMPQ  (2) 
 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷$% = XYZLMNOLMPQ 	− 	 a( 	+ 	 a* *NOLMPQ 	+ 	 a7 UOVWLMNOLMPQ + 	 a8 ∆UOVWLMTOLMPQ 	+ 	 a9 ∆UOVWLMPQTOLMPQ  (3) 
 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴$% = U\OLMNOLMPQ 	− 	 a( 	+ 	 a* *	TOLMPQ 	+ 	 a7 UOVWULMPQNOLMPQ  (4) 
 
Varible definitions, 
 
i and t denote firm, year, respectively. 
 𝑂𝐶𝐹$%: : cash flows from operations; 𝑃𝑅𝐷$% : production costs (= cost of goods sold + change in inventory ); 𝑆𝐺𝐴$% : discretionary expenses; 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹$%  : the absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷$%  : the absolute value of abnormal production costs; 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴$%  : the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆$% : sales; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆$%]* : lagged sales; ∆SALEbc : changes in sales; ∆SALEbc]* : lagged changes in sales; 𝑇𝐴$%]*	 : total assets at the beginning of year; 𝜀$%	 : residual. 
 
3.3. Sample Selection 
 
We employ the data collected from 2009 to 2014 from the Korean stock market. The sample selection process is summarized 
in Table 1. We first eliminate the quoted non-financial December firms for which financial and stock data cannot be collected 
from FN-Guide. Those firms whose year-ends are not on December 31 are excluded because of data homogeneity. Financial 
firms are also eliminated since the nature of the business is different from our sample. The final sample for regression analyses 
is 2,565 firm-year observations. We winsorized each of the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the effect of 
outliers except dummy variables. Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution across fiscal years in our sample. Panel B of Table 
2 shows the distribution by industry in our sample, of which Cokes & Chemical (11.46%), Professional services (10.29%), 
Retail & Whole sales (8.38%), and Publishing & Broadcating (8.23%) are the most representative industries.  
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Criteria Firm-Year Observations 
Quoted December 31 firms for fiscal years 2009-2014 4,010 
(less) financial firms (264) 
(less) Firms for which financial and board data cannot be collected from FN-Guide (1,181) 
final sample 2,565 
 
 
Table 2. Distributions over the sample period 
Panel A: Distribution across fiscal years 
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
2009 244 9.51 
2010 235 9.16 
2011 501 19.53 
2012 510 19.88 
2013 531 20.70 
2014 544 21.21 
Total 2,565 100 
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution  
Industry Frequency Percent(%) 
Food, Beverage 143 5.58 
Fiber, Clothes, Leathers 112 4.37 
Timber, Pulp, Furniture 103 4.02 
Cokes, Chemical 294 11.46 
Medical  Manufacturing 142 5.54 
Rubber & Plastic 70 2.73 
Non Metallic 79 3.08 
Metallic 187 7.29 
Pc, Medical 167 6.51 
Machine & Electronic  170 6.63 
Other Trnsportation 181 7.06 
Construction 114 4.44 
Retail  & Whole Sales 215 8.38 
Transportation Service 84 3.27 
Publishing, Broadcating 211 8.23 
Professional Services 264 10.29 
Other 69 1.13 
Total 2,565 100 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in regression analyses. The means (medians) of 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹 , 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷 , and 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴  are 0.071 (0.058), 0.094 (0.071), and 0.074 (0.051), respectively.  
 
About 46% of board members are independent director (OUTBOARD), and the mean of board size 0.023. The 
average SIZE is 27.034. The mean leverage (LEV) is 48.5%. The mean MTB and ROA are is 1.019 and 0.024%, 
respectively. firms with loss are about 24%. The means (medians) of ownership (OWN) and foreign ownership 
(FOR) are 44.13% (44.50%) and 9.61% (3.81%), respectively.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N=2,565) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th percentile Median 75th percentile AbOCF  0.071 0.080 0.034 0.058 0.214 AbPRD  0.094 0.120 0.051 0.071 0.252 AbSGA  0.074 0.094 0.029 0.051 0.312 
OUTBOARD 0.462 0.126 0.400 0.444 0.500 
BOARDSIZE 0.023 0.006 0.020 0.023 0.026 
SIZE 27.034 1.592 25.924 26.816 27.892 
MTB 1.019 2.356 0.479 0.751 1.180 
LEV 0.485 0.206 0.324 0.485 0.629 
ROA 0.024 0.084 0.001 0.028 0.060 
LOSSDUM 0.236 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OWN 44.134 16.458 32.090 44.500 54.750 
FOR 9.614 13.101 0.837 3.806 13.646 
 
Variable Definitions 
 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (2); 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (3); 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴  : the absolute value of the residual value of Eq. (4); 
OUTBOARD : board independence, ( independent directors / the board size); 
BOARDSIZE : board size, (the number of board of directors / the nature logarithm of total assets); 
SIZE : firm size, the nature logarithm of total assets; 
MTB : market-to-book ratio, (market value / book value of common equity); 
LEV : debt ratio, (long-term debt / total assets); 
ROA : return on assets, (income /total assets); 
LOSSDUM  : loss dummy variable; 
OWN : ownership; 
FOR : foreign ownership. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 4 shows Pearson correlations among regression variables. 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹 	is significantly and positively (+) correlated with 
BOARDSIZE at 1%. This means bigger board size makes larger real earnings management using cash flow from operating 
activities. 
 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷  is significantly and positively (+) correlated with OUTBOARD and BOARDSIZE at 5% and 5%, respectively. This 
means higher board independence and bigger board size make larger real earnings management using production costs. 
 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴  is significantly and positively (+) correlated with BOARDSIZE at 10%. This means bigger board size makes larger 
real earnings management using discretionary expenses. 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹  1 0.187*** 0.096*** 0.031 0.040** -0.026 0.019 0.012 0.048** 0.001 -0.022 0.051*** 
(2) 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷   1 0.410*** 0.039** 0.045** -0.015 0.019 0.040** 0.069*** -0.036* -0.014 0.053*** 
(3) 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴    1 -0.002 0.033* -0.108*** 0.025 0.021 0.038* -0.026 0.017 -0.057*** 
(4)OUTBOARD    1 0.950*** 0.344*** 0.042** 0.123*** -0.027 0.036* -0.088*** 0.176*** 
(5)BOARDSIZE     1 0.044** 0.045** 0.043** -0.072*** 0.074*** -0.072*** 0.035* 
(6)SIZE      1 -0.008 0.277*** 0.124*** -0.108*** -0.052*** 0.462*** 
(7)MTB       1 0.016 0.003 -0.001 -0.069*** 0.085*** 
8)LEV        1 -0.367*** 0.349*** -0.147*** -0.106*** 
(9)ROA         1 -0.627*** 0.137*** 0.207*** 
(10)LOSSDUM          1 -0.122*** -0.154*** 
(11)OWN           1 -0.185*** 
(12)FOR            1 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
4.3 Multivariate Results 
 
Using models (1), we perform a multivariate regression analysis to test whether board independence (board size) is associated 
with real earnings management. Table 5 presents the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether 
board independence (board size) is associated with 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹 . The coefficient (β* ) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is 
significantly positive (+) at 5% (5%) with	 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹 . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not 
costrain abnormal cash flows from operations.  
 
Table 6 shows the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board independence (board size) is 
associated with 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷 . The coefficient (β*) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is significantly positive (+) at 1% (1%) with 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷 . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not costrain abnormal production costs.  
 
Table 7 shows the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board independence (board size) is 
associated with 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴 . The coefficient (β*) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is significantly positive (+) at 1% (1%) with 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴 . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not costrain abnormal discretionary expenses. 
 
 
Table 5. Results on abnormal cash flows from operations (H-1) 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable OUTBOARD Predicted 
Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.152*** 5.900  1.074*** 5.530 
OUTBOARD (+/-) 0.170** 2.140    
BOARDSIZE    (+/-) 3.216** 2.060 
SIZE (-) -0.031*** -3.960 (-) -0.027*** -3.590 
MTB (-) 0.016*** 2.880 (-) 0.016*** 2.940 
LEV (+) 0.128** 2.290 (+) 0.128** 2.300 
ROA (-) 0.535*** 3.630 (-) 0.526*** 3.580 
LOSSDUM (+) 0.042 1.480 (+) 0.042 1.480 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.200 (+) 0.001 0.210 
FOR (-) 0.003*** 3.320 (-) 0.003*** 3.320 
YD  yes  yes 
ID  yes  yes 
No.  2,565  2,565 
F-VALUE  3.27***  3.25*** 
ADJ R-SQ  2.04%  2.04% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6. Results on Abnormal production costs (H-2) 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable OUTBOARD Predicted 
Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.026*** 5.530  0.858*** 4.660 
OUTBOARD (+/-) 0.222*** 2.960    
BOARDSIZE    (+/-) 4.285*** 2.900 
SIZE (-) -0.029*** -3.930 (-) -0.023*** -3.240 
MTB (-) 0.002 0.320 (-) 0.002 0.400 
LEV (+) 0.250*** 4.720 (+) 0.245*** 4.630 
ROA (-) 0.597*** 4.280 (-) 0.582*** 4.180 
LOSSDUM (+) -0.015 -0.550 (+) -0.015 -0.560 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.480 (+) 0.001 0.500 
FOR (-) 0.003*** 3.980 (-) 0.003*** 3.950 
YD  yes  yes 
ID  yes  yes 
No.  2,565  2,565 
F-VALUE  7.14***  8.35*** 
ADJ R-SQ  6.38%  6.28% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
Table 7. Results on Abnormal discretionary expenses (H-3) 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable OUTBOARD Predicted 
Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.302*** 7.420  1.139*** 6.510 
OUTBOARD (+/-) 0.195*** 2.730    
BOARDSIZE    (+/-) 3.925*** 2.790 
SIZE (-) -0.037*** -5.250 (-) -0.031*** -4.670 
MTB (-) 0.005 0.970 (-) 0.006 1.090 
LEV (+) 0.187*** 3.720 (+) 0.180*** 3.590 
ROA (-) 0.454*** 3.430 (-) 0.433*** 3.280 
LOSSDUM (+) -0.041 -1.600 (+) -0.041 -1.580 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.500 (+) 0.001 0.530 
FOR (-) 0.001 0.390 (-) 0.001 0.330 
YD  yes  yes 
ID  yes  yes 
No.  2,565  2,565 
F-VALUE  14.72***  17.42*** 
ADJ R-SQ  13.23%  13.03% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
4.4 Additional Analyses  
 
4.4.1 Regression Analyses Considering Before and After Adoption of K-IFRS  
 
The adoption of Korea adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter K-IFRS) has led to significant 
changes for companies that comply with regulatory disclosure requirements. Also, the adoption of K-IFRS resulted in 
an exogenous and anecdotal change in the level of mandatory information. Under the changed institutional 
environment, corporate governance can work differently at managerial level of real earnings management. 
Accordingly, we divide the sample into Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS sub-samples and analyses H1-H3 in each subsample.    
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Table 8 – Table 10 present the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board 
independence (board size) is associated with 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹$% , 𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷$% , and 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴$%  according to each subsample, 
respectively.  
 
Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not constrain abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses in Post-IFRS sub-samples only. 
 
 
Table 8. Results on abnormal cash flows from operations: 
Regression analyses considering before and after adoption of K-IFRS (H-1) 𝐴𝑏𝑂𝐶𝐹$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Predicted Sign 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.108** 2.420 1.148*** 5.310 
OUTBOARD (+/-) -0.012 -0.070 0.217** 2.380 
BOARDSIZE      
SIZE (-) -0.028 -1.580 -0.031*** -3.600 
MTB (-) 0.057* 1.790 0.015*** 2.650 
LEV (+) 0.065 0.460 0.139** 2.280 
ROA (-) 0.516 1.360 0.507*** 3.140 
LOSSDUM (+) 0.068 0.910 0.037 1.190 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.510 0.001 -0.110 
FOR (-) 0.001 0.480 0.003*** 3.360 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  1.77** 2.36*** 
ADJ R-SQ  3.82% 1.69% 
 
(Table 8 continued) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.149** 2.460 1.041*** 4.860 
OUTBOARD      
BOARDSIZE (+/-) -0.405 -0.120 4.068** 2.280 
SIZE (-) -0.029* -1.650 -0.026*** -3.150 
MTB (-) 0.059* 1.860 0.015*** 2.670 
LEV (+) 0.065 0.460 0.141** 2.310 
ROA (-) 0.509 1.350 0.503*** 3.120 
LOSSDUM (+) 0.069 0.910 0.036 1.180 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.500 0.001 -0.100 
FOR (-) 0.001 0.450 0.003*** 3.370 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  1.83** 2.46*** 
ADJ R-SQ  3.95% 1.61% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Table 9. Results on Abnormal production costs: Regression analyses considering before and after adoption of K-IFRS (H-2) 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2017 Volume 33, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1260 The Clute Institute 
𝐴𝑏𝑃𝑅𝐷$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Predicted Sign 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.463*** 3.360 0.953*** 4.660 
OUTBOARD (+/-) 0.095 0.600 0.267*** 3.090 
BOARDSIZE      
SIZE (-) -0.045 -2.660 -0.027*** -3.270 
MTB (-) 0.004 0.130 0.002 0.330 
LEV (+) 0.299** 2.220 0.240*** 4.150 
ROA (-) 1.104*** 3.070 0.486*** 3.180 
LOSSDUM (+) 0.029 0.410 -0.024 -0.820 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.040 0.001 0.340 
FOR (-) 0.001 -0.120 0.004*** 4.500 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  1.73** 7.30*** 
ADJ R-SQ  3.63% 7.38% 
 
(Table 9 continued) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.443*** 3.250 0.749*** 3.690 
OUTBOARD      
BOARDSIZE (+/-) 1.590 0.500 5.182*** 3.070 
SIZE (-) -0.044*** -2.610 -0.019** -2.470 
MTB (-) 0.006 0.200 0.002 0.390 
LEV (+) 0.299** 2.220 0.234*** 4.050 
ROA (-) 1.099*** 3.060 0.469*** 3.070 
LOSSDUM (+) 0.029 0.400 -0.024 -0.830 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.360 
FOR (-) 0.001 -0.150 0.004*** 4.070 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  1.78** 7.97*** 
ADJ R-SQ  3.74% 7.24% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 10. Results on Abnormal discretionary expenses: 
Regression analyses considering before and after adoption of K-IFRS (H-3) 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐺𝐴$% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷$%	 𝑜𝑟	𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵$% + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽<𝑅𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽=𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀$% +𝛽>𝑂𝑊𝑁$% + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀$% (1) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Predicted Sign 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.143*** 3.490 1.285*** 6.570 
OUTBOARD (+/-) -0.022 -0.150 0.264*** 3.200 
BOARDSIZE      
SIZE (-) -0.038** -2.410 -0.038*** -4.810 
MTB (-) 0.004 0.130 0.005 1.020 
LEV (+) 0.174 1.390 0.194*** 3.510 
ROA (-) 0.228 0.680 0.500*** 3.420 
LOSSDUM (+) -0.068 -1.020 -0.038 -1.370 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.360 0.001 0.380 
FOR (-) -0.002 -0.980 0.001 0.980 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  4.36** 12.75*** 
ADJ R-SQ  14.83% 12.94% 
 
(Table 10 continued) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Independent Variable BOARDSIZE 
Pre-IFRS 
(2009-2010) 
Post-IFRS 
(2001-2014) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  1.505*** 3.630 1.075*** 5.550 
OUTBOARD      
BOARDSIZE (+/-) -0.389 -0.130 5.173*** 3.210 
SIZE (-) -0.040** -2.560 -0.030*** -4.070 
MTB (-) 0.009 0.320 0.005 1.070 
LEV (+) 0.172 1.370 0.188*** 3.400 
ROA (-) 0.215 0.640 0.484*** 3.320 
LOSSDUM (+) -0.067 -1.010 -0.039 -1.400 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.320 0.001 0.390 
FOR (-) -0.002 -1.100 0.001 0.950 
YD  yes yes 
ID  yes yes 
No.  479 2,086 
F-VALUE  4.33** 14.16*** 
ADJ R-SQ  14.21% 12.83% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We empirically examine the association between the characteristics of the board of directors and real earnings 
management and then investigate the extent to which this association is affected by characteristics of the board of 
directors according to before or after Korea adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011. Real 
earnings management is measured by Roychowdhury (2006). Additionally, the characteristics of the board of directors 
is used by a board independence (the proportion of independent directors on the board) and board size. 
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The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the relation between board independence (board size) and the 
absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations, absolute value of abnormal production costs, and the absolute 
value of abnormal discretionary expenses is statistically significant and positive (+), respectively, suggesting that the 
board independence (or boardsize) does not reduce real earnings management.  
 
This study contributes to accounting research as it directly tests the association between the characteristics of the board 
of directors and real earnings management in Korea, providing empirical support that a board independence (board 
size) does not effectively reduce real earnings management. 
 
The limitations of this study are as follows. First, we might have not considered omitted other variables. Second, we 
might not have fully considered other proxies for the characteristics of the board of directors. 
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